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I. Introduction
The Supreme Court's recent holding in Archer v. Warner (In re Warner)1
is an anticontractual decision that threatens the autonomy of parties to create
valid settlement agreements that have lasting effect within bankruptcy courts.
The linchpin of contract law is the freedom of parties to bargain for beneficial
provisions. Thus, the public policy in favor of encouraging settlements not
only recognizes the importance of encouraging contractual settlements but also
the enforcement of valid agreements:2 "Because contract law presumes that
parties will not consensually enter into a contract unless each party perceives a
net benefit, courts enforce contracts absent good reason not to do so. "
3
Instead of upholding the basic tenets of contract law, Archer stated that
bankruptcy courts should "look behind" privately contracted settlements to
determine if the underlying and completely-released original debt was
1. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314 (2003). For a discussion of the Archer
case, see Parts 11-V.
2. See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text (describing the public policy
encouraging settlement).
3. Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77
TEX. L. REV. 515, 545 (1999). Schwarcz notes the following reasons that cause courts to
override contracts: violation of statute, "if the contract harms the contracting parties[,] or
impinges on the rights of noncontracting parties." The latter reasons are "expressed in contract
law defenses based on unconscionability ... duress or information asymmetry." Id. at 545-47.
None of these defenses are at issue in Archer.
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obtained by fraud.4 The factual scenario in Archer, however, did not involve
any of the circumstances that typically cause courts to override a contract, such
as unconscionability or duress. Yet the Supreme Court has crafted a decision
that ultimately discards release provisions to which both parties have agreed.
Thus, the question presented is whether Archer offers a compelling reason for
allowing a bankruptcy court to derail the fundamental core of contract law, or if
Archer only creates a contractual quagmire for creditors and debtors who desire
to settle an alleged fraud claim.
Consider a situation in which A (a buyer) files suit against B (a seller) for
fraudulent activity relating to a sale. Prior to litigation of the state court claim,
A and B, both represented by counsel, agree to a settlement in which B agrees to
pay a fixed sum in exchange for the buyer's complete release of all claims
relating to the state court action. B makes a significant cash payment, and the
rest of the settlement is secured by a promissory note. Neither an admission of
liability nor a mention of fraud is included in the agreement. A dismisses the
state fraud claim with prejudice. A's only source of remedy is the enforcement
of the note because the settlement agreement expressly released all other claims
relating to the state litigation. B defaults on the settlement payments. A
attempts to enforce the settlement by using the released fraud claims. Although
B objects to the resurrection of the claims, the court examines the
circumstances behind the settlement agreement to determine if the original debt
was fraudulent.
Under state contract law, examining the released original debt and
underlying circumstances would be an outrage to the basic concept of
novation,5 which is "[tihe act of substituting for an old obligation a new one
that either replaces an existing obligation with a new obligation or replaces the
original party with a new party."'6 A novation immediately extinguishes the
prior obligation, and "the obligee, therefore, has no right to enforce the original
duty, even on breach by the obligor of the substituted contract."7 If the obligor
breaches the novation, then the obligee is limited to "its remedies under the
substituted contract that has replaced that duty.",
8
4. See Parts II-V (discussing the Archer decision and analyzing the Supreme Court's
reasoning).
5. See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 21.8 (5th ed. 2003)
("The word 'novation' is used in a variety of senses. Courts frequently use it as synonymous
with 'substituted contract."').
6. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1091 (7th ed. 1999).
7. E. ALLAN FARNswoRTH, CONTRACTS § 4.24 (3d ed. 1999).
8. d.
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In the hypothetical, the settlement agreement is a novation because it
completely substituted the earlier alleged tort debt with a new contractual
obligation. Upon breach of the settlement, A no longer has the option to seek
enforcement on the alleged tort debt. The prior obligation is nonexistent, and a
proper state court decision would bar further litigation of the released fraud
claim. Under the terms of the novation, A's remedy is limited to the
enforcement of the promissory note as a contractual obligation.
Now, consider this revision to the hypothetical. B defaults on the payment
of the settlement and files for bankruptcy. B seeks to discharge this debt in
bankruptcy. The bankruptcy discharge relieves the debtor by "operat[ing] as an
injunction against all efforts to recover debts owed prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy case as a personal liability of the debtor." 9 A objects to the
dischargeability of the debt, alleging that the debt is nondischargeable because
it was obtained by fraud and thus falls under the exception to discharge in
Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.' 0 This situation raises several
questions. Should the bankruptcy outcome be the same as the state court
outcome? Does the state contract concept of novation apply in bankruptcy?
How should the creditor respond to this possible loss of the settlement in
bankruptcy? The Supreme Court recently addressed this set of circumstances
in Archer, a decision that attempted to reconcile the divisive circuit split
concerning these questions."
The two approaches advocated by the circuit split exemplify the
above mentioned hypothetical and the two proposed outcomes. The majority
9. Terrence L. Michael & Michael R. Pacewicz, Settling Objections to Discharge in
Bankruptcy Cases: An Unsettling Look at Very Unsettled Law, 37 TULSA L. REv. 637, 639
(2002). According to Michael and Pacewicz:
In Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, the United States Supreme Court coined the oft-cited
phrase that bankruptcy laws exist to provide "the honest but unfortunate debtor who
surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a
new opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, unhampered by the
pressure and discouragement of pre-existing debt."
Id. at 638-39. The discharge relief offered by bankruptcy is not absolute, and the Bankruptcy
Code includes exceptions to this general rule. This Note focuses on the exception to discharge
covered by § 523(a)(2)(A), which prevents discharge for those debts obtained by fraud.
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A) (2000) (stating that the Bankruptcy Code does not
permit a discharge under this section for "debt[s] ... obtained by ... false pretenses, a false
representation, or actual fraud"); see also Katherine S. Kruis, Is Your Prepetition Judgment
Worth Anything? Prebankruptcy Planning for the Litigator, 27 CAL. BANKR. J. 5, 5 (2003)
(noting that "[aill prepetition debts are discharged under Bankruptcy Code ... Section 727(a),
unless one of the Section 523(a) exceptions applies").
11. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314 (2003). For a discussion of the Archer
case, see Parts III-V.
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approach claims that a bankruptcy court has a duty to conduct the fullest
inquiry into the nature of a debt for dischargeability purposes.12 Therefore, the
bankruptcy court should examine the circumstances underlying a settlement
agreement to determine if the original debt had been obtained by fraud. 13 In
contrast, the minority approach favors a contractual perspective that enforces a
novation as the replacement of a tortious debt with a contractual obligation that
is dischargeable in bankruptcy.14 The minority approach relies heavily on the
public policy supporting settlements and the enforcement of valid settlement
agreements, no matter the nature of the underlying debt that led to the
settlement.15 According to the minority approach, the incentive to settle is gone
if the settlement agreement is not enforced within bankruptcy.
16
Applying the majority approach, Archer permitted a bankruptcy court to
look behind the settlement agreement to determine if the underlying debt had
been obtained by fraud and thus was nondischargeable in bankruptcy under
Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 17 Archer agreed with the lower
court's holding that the Archer settlement agreement completely released all
state claims and may have created a novation. 1 But the Court's inquiry did not
end at this point because the next question was whether this debt could also be
a debt obtained by fraud, as described within the exceptions to discharge in
bankruptcy.' 9
Archer relied heavily on Brown v. Felsen (In re Brown),2° the foundation
case for the majority approach, and this Note argues that Brown is not the
proper governing precedent for the circumstances in Archer. Brown is a res
judicata case that concerns a debt embodied in a consent judgment that lacks
any type of release provisions. 22 In comparison, Archer includes a novation,
12. See Brown v. Felsen (In re Brown), 442 U.S. 127, 138-39 (1979) (discussing the
broad inquiry intended by Congress for debts that are supposed to survive bankruptcy).
13. Elizabeth Warren & Jay L. Westbrook, Settling into Bankruptcy, AM. BANKR. INsT. J.,




17. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314, 321-23 (2003).
18. Id. at 323.
19. Id. at 319.
20. Brown v. Felsen (In re Brown), 442 U.S. 127 (1979). For a discussion of the Brown
case, see infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 152-75 and accompanying text (discussing whether Brown was the
proper governing precedent for the Supreme Court's decision in Archer).
22. Brown, 442 U.S. at 128-31.
1805
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1801 (2004)
which replaced the allegedly tortious debt with a contractual obligation
dischargeable in bankruptcy.23
This Note also argues that Archer includes inconsistencies and creates
confusion rather than a definitive resolution to the divisive circuit split. 24 For
example, the Supreme Court first stated that the Archer settlement agreement
may have created a novation, but then the Court ignored the novation theory to
discuss Brown, a res judicata case.25 Archer agreed that the settlement released
all underlying state claims but then stated that the fraud issue had not been
resolved.26 Perhaps one of the most telling inconsistencies is that Archer
maintained one aspect of the contractual arrangement, the promissory note,
27while discarding the release provisions.
Another issue this Note addresses is Archer's apparent disregard for the
public policy encouraging settlements.28  Courts have long adhered to the
policy supporting settlements, which in turn promotes judicial efficiency and
certainty between parties.29  This policy serves an important role within
novation theory.30 Archer, however, did not discuss the importance of
settlements or consider the effect that the decision may have on future
settlements. What incentive does a debtor have to settle if the debtor's fate will
be subject to a fixed settlement in bankruptcy but will not receive the benefits
of the bargained-for releases? This Note suggests that Archer may have a
detrimental effect on settlements.
31
In addition, this Note examines Archer in light of the underlying
principles in Burner v. United States32 and the possible effect Archer may have
23. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d 230,237 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 538 U.S.
314 (2003).
24. See Part V (analyzing Archer and the underlying issues that were not addressed in the
decision).
25. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314, 319-21 (2003).
26. Id. at 318-19.
27. Id. at 328 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
28. See infra notes 176-84 and accompanying text (discussing the public policy to
encourage settlements and questioning whether Archer discourages debtors from seeking
settlement of fraud claims).
29. See infra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (describing the importance of the
public policy to encourage settlements between conflicted parties).
30. See infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text (stating that novation emphasizes the
importance of settlement).
31. See infra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (suggesting that Archer may
discourage debtors from settling fraud claims with creditors because the release provisions will
not be maintained in bankruptcy, whereas the settlement will be considered the debt for
bankruptcy purposes).
32. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). For a discussion of the Butner case, see
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on forum shopping. Butner essentially stated that the federal bankruptcy
courts have a responsibility to ensure that parties receive the same
protection within bankruptcy that they would have received in state
proceedings if no bankruptcy had occurred.34 Accordingly, bankruptcy
courts should implement nonbankruptcy law unless a federal interest
demands otherwise. 35 In a state court proceeding, B (the debtor) would
have received the benefits of the novation. Yet in bankruptcy under
Archer, B loses the bargained-for release provisions while A (the creditor)
maintains the promissory note. 36  This Note proposes that Archer's
inequitable implementation of a contractual agreement would not have
occurred outside of bankruptcy. The Butner principle stresses the need for
uniform outcomes to combat forum shopping within bankruptcy.37 Archer,
however, appears to provide a strong incentive for creditors to file
involuntary bankruptcy petitions so that they can avoid release provisions
while maintaining the fixed settlement payments. Thus, this Note asserts
38that Archer exacerbates forum shopping.
The Supreme Court had the opportunity in Archer to craft an opinion
that evaluated the novation theory and effectively resolved the circuit split
surrounding this issue. This Note argues that Archer did not address the
vital issues in this conflict. Archer overlooked the importance of
settlements and the Butner principle. Moreover, Archer did not deliver a
definitive position on the novation theory. Because the parties bargained
for the provisions in the settlement agreement, which in turn created a
novation, Archer should have limited the buyer's remedies to the
provisions of the settlement agreement or substituted obligation, which
explicitly released all state claims other than the promissory note.
This Note proposes that a variety of options exist to prevent the
creation of a novation in the Archer settlement agreement. These options
infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 185-208 and accompanying text (discussing the forum shopping
problem within bankruptcy and arguing that Archer will heighten this problem).
34. Butner, 440 U.S. at 56.
35. Id. at 55.
36. See Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314, 328 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the majority opinion in Archer upheld the settlement as the proper
measure of damages but ignored the release provisions also included in the settlement
agreement).
37. Butner, 440 U.S. at 55.
38. See infra notes 197-208 and accompanying text (asserting that Archer violates the
Butner principle and exacerbates forum shopping).
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include accord agreements,39 the addition of liability and fraud admissions
by the debtors in settlements, 4° and the formal adjudication of fraud claims
to final judgment. 4' Parties can avoid the creation of a novation by careful
and thoughtful settlement construction. Competent counsel would have
negotiated for a settlement agreement that would meet the needs of the
client rather than constructing a settlement agreement with broad general
releases that provides little or no protection in bankruptcy. Thus, the
proper course of relief for the creditors in Archer was a malpractice action
against their counsel, rather than filing suit against the debtors who had
fairly bargained for the provisions within the settlement agreement.
This Note presents an in-depth analysis of the recent Supreme Court
decision in Archer and proposes that the Court improperly reversed the
Fourth Circuit decision. Part II outlines the circuit split surrounding this
issue prior to Archer. Part III describes the Fourth Circuit's decision in
Archer. This Part explains the Fourth Circuit's reliance on the novation
theory and the emphasis placed on the public policy in favor of
encouraging settlements. Part IV discusses the Supreme Court's reversal in
Archer and the reasoning that focused on Brown as the governing
precedent. Part V presents an analysis of the Supreme Court's decision in
Archer and questions the Court's choice in governing precedent. This Part
asserts that Archer failed to address the public policy in favor of
settlements and the Butner principle, which emphasizes the necessity of
uniform outcomes in state and bankruptcy court proceedings to avoid forum
shopping. This Part also discusses whether either party's counsel should be
held responsible for either the failed settlement or the Supreme Court
reversal of Archer. Part VI states that the Archer decision was not the only means
to protect the creditor as a victim of fraud and focuses on the alternative actions
available to the creditors to protect the settlement while preventing the creation of a
novation. This Note concludes by explaining why the Supreme Court's
reversal in Archer was improper and how the creditors could have received
39. See infra notes 262-67 and accompanying text (discussing the accord agreement as a
settlement agreement option that would have allowed the creditors in Archer to maintain the
nondischargeable nature of the settlement without creating a novation).
40. See infra notes 257-61 and accompanying text (describing provisions of liability and
statements of a prima facie fraud case that might be included in a settlement agreement to
prevent the creation of a novation and to maintain the nondischargeable character of a
settlement).
41. See infra notes 251-56 (stating that the most effective method of maintaining the
nondischargeable nature of a debt obtained by fraud is to seek final judgment within a state
court proceeding).
1808
ARCHER v. WARNER: CIRCUIT SPLIT RESOLUTION?
relief without pressing the courts to override contractual release provisions
and the creation of a novation.
II. The Circuit Split Prior to Archer v. Warner
The prior case law concerning the applicability of the novation theory
versus the bankruptcy courts' alleged right to look behind a settlement
agreement created a splintered background for the Supreme Court's decision in
Archer.42 Thus, an understanding of the circuit split is essential to a thorough
analysis of the Archer decision. The starting point for this discussion is the
majority approach, which is heavily influenced by Brown v. Felsen (In re
Brown)43 and endorses the bankruptcy court's ability to look behind the
settlement agreement to determine if the underlying debt is fraudulent.44
A. Brown v. Felsen: Establishing the Majority Approach
In Brown, the debtor and the creditor reduced a fraud suit in state court to a
consent judgment.45 The terms of the consent judgment included a stipulation
that the debtor pay the creditor a fixed sum; however, neither the judgment nor
the stipulation referred to the underlying fraud claim from the original lawsuit.
46
The debtor later filed for bankruptcy, and the creditor objected to the
dischargeability of the debt, alleging that the debt arose from the debtor's fraud,
one of the Bankruptcy Code's exceptions for discharge.47
The debtor argued that res judicata barred further litigation on the
underlying debt.48 Pursuant to the debtor's argument, the bankruptcy court
would be limited to the evidence in the state court record, which did not include
any findings of fraud.49 The debtor also asserted that the creditor had failed to
42. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314 (2003). For a discussion of the Archer
case, see infra notes 118-37 and accompanying text.
43. Brown v. Felsen (In re Brown), 442 U.S. 127 (1979). For a discussion of the Brown
case, see infra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
44. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 13, at 16.
45. See Brown, 442 U.S. at 128 (discussing the state suit in which Felsen alleged that
Brown had fraudulently induced Felsen to sign a loan guarantee).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 128-29.
48. Id. at 128-31.
49. Id. at 130 ("The bankruptcy court ... confined its consideration to... the state-court
record .... The [Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit] noted that neither the stipulation nor
the judgment mentioned fraud .... ").
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obtain a stipulation in the consent judgment concerning fraud and that, due to
this failure to act, the creditor should be barred from litigating issues that should
50have been decided in the state consent judgment.
Although the lower courts had upheld the dischargeable nature of the debt,
the Supreme Court stated that "careful inquiry reveals that neither the interests
served by res judicata, the process of orderly adjudication in state courts, nor the
policies of the Bankruptcy Act would be well served by foreclosing petitioner
from submitting additional evidence to prove his case."''0 The Court found that
the bankruptcy policy interests in "honest dealing and honest conduct" required
that the bankruptcy court have access to extrinsic evidence beyond the state court
record to make an accurate determination of the nature of the debt.52 Brown also
stated that the creditor was not attempting to bypass the consent judgment but was
only responding to the new defense of bankruptcy, which the debtor had injected
between the creditor and the repayment due. 3 The Court in Brown reversed the
findings of the lower courts and permitted the bankruptcy court to consider
extrinsic evidence concerning the underlying debt.
5 4
B. United States v. Spicer: Defining the Majority Approach in the
D.C. Circuit
United States v. Spicer (In re Spicer)"5 provides a more in-depth and recent
analysis of the majority approach. Spicer analyzed the nature of a settlement
agreement between the United States (creditor) and Spicer (debtor), a real estate
broker who had defrauded the government by misrepresenting realty down
payments and helping buyers improperly qualify for FHA-insured mortgages.56
After the debtor's criminal conviction for interstate transportation of money
obtained by fraud and prior to the litigation of the civil fraud claim, the two
50. Id. at 132.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 138-39.
53. Id. at 133.
54. Id. at 138-39. Commenting on the majority opinion in Brown, Robert I. D'Agostino
states, "Brown did not address the issue of whether the substitution of a contract debt for a debt
sounding in tort, which would be nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523 (a)(2) created a
novation." Robert J. D'Agostino, Archer v. Warner: A Clarification, NORTON BANKR. L.
ADvisER 1, 2-3 (2003).
55. United States v. Spicer (In re Spicer), 57 F.3d 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1995). For a
discussion of the Spicer case, see infra notes 56-71 and accompanying text.
56. Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1154.
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parties reached a settlement agreement. 57 The debtor agreed to pay the creditor
$339,000 as set forth in two promissory notes included in the settlement, and in
return, the creditor released all civil fraud claims. 58 The settlement agreement did
not contain any admission of liability by the debtor.59
Two years after the execution of the agreement, the debtor filed for
bankruptcy, and in turn, the creditor objected to the discharge of the debt.6° The
creditor claimed that the debt was nondischargeable because it had been obtained
by fraud, an exception to discharge presented in Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the
Bankruptcy Code.6' In response, the debtor argued that pursuant to West v.
Oltman (In re West),62 the settlement agreement served as a novation that released
the original debt while creating a new contractual obligation.63 Accordingly, the
debtor claimed that the settlement agreement created a purely contractual
obligation, and "ordinary contractual obligations, unlike debts for money or
property obtained by fraud, are dischargeable in bankruptcy."
64
Although the Spicer court agreed that West supported the debtor's
argument, it declined to follow the novation approach. 65 The novation theory
"improperly elevates legal form over substance." 66 Indeed, the Spicer court
claimed that "[s]ettlement makes the dishonest debtor no more honest, and no
more entitled to the relief Congress intended to reserve for the honest debtor. ,
67
The court concluded that a bankruptcy court should analyze the circumstances
behind the settlement agreement and focus on the "substance" of the original







62. West v. Oltman (In re West), 22 F.3d 775 (7th Cir. 1994). For a discussion of the
West decision, see infra notes 81-94 and accompanying text.




67. Id. at 1156.
68. Id. at 1157. The Spicer court stated that "a fraudulent debtor may not escape
nondischargeability... merely by altering the forn of his debt through a settlement agreement,
whether or not the agreement includes an express release or waiver of the fraud claim." Id. at
1156. Thus, Spicer suggests that an express waiver or release is not determinative, which
disregards the value of any expressed release or waiver in a contractual agreement.
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The majority approach, heavily influenced by Brown, endorses the
bankruptcy court's ability to look behind the settlement agreement to determine if
the underlying debt is fraudulent and thus nondischargeable. 69 An accurate
determination, according to Brown, requires an examination of the circumstances
underlying a settlement agreement and the original debt.70 Spicer reiterated the
Brown holdings and further asserted that a change in the form of a debt does not
permit the dishonest debtor to receive the benefits of discharge, which are limited
to the "honest but unfortunate debtor.'
1
C. The Minority Approach: Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing
The minority approach, herein referred to as novation,72 stems from the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing.73 In Maryland
Casualty, the court analyzed a promissory note in which the defendant agreed to
make installment payments on a $14,970 debt.74 In exchange, the plaintiff
expressly released all tort claims stemming from the defendant's original
embezzlement debt.75 At issue in the case was whether the promissory note debt
was dischargeable in bankruptcy as a contractual obligation, or if the promissory
note had retained the antecedent tort character of the embezzlement debt and, as
such, was nondischargeable.76
Maryland Casualty affirmed that "the general rule is that a promissory note
is but evidence of indebtedness and does not discharge the debt for which it was
given. 77 On the other hand, if the promissory note is expressly given and
received as a release of the original debt-in this case, a waiver of the tortious
debt claims-and the parties agree that the note serves as a new and substituting
69. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 13, at 16.
70. Id.
71. United States v. Spicer (In re Spicer), 57 F.3d 1152, 1155-56 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
72. The minority approach was originally referred to as the Maryland Casualty approach;
however, more recent cases refer to the new promissory note as a "novation." For purposes of
this Note, the minority approach will be labeled as novation throughout the discussion. See
Kristopher Aungst, Warner Splits the Circuits, NORTON BANKR. L. ADVISER 12, 13 (2003)
(stating that the Ninth Circuit "labeled this new note a novation," which discharged all claims
arising out of the original obligation).
73. Md. Cas. Co. v. Cushing, 171 F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1948). For a discussion of the
Maryland Casualty case, see infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
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obligation for the original debt, then the promissory note "discharge[s]" the
original debt.78 Maryland Casualty concluded that the parties' acceptance of the
note extinguished the "antecedent tort action" that had existed prior to the
acceptance of the promissory note.79 Thus, the court affirmed the holding of the
lower court that the note served as a contractual obligation dischargeable in
bankruptcy.80
D. West v. Oltman: Reaffirming the Novation Approach
The Seventh Circuit refined the novation approach in West v. Oltman (In
re West).8 1 The debtor in West signed a promissory note for $75,000 in
exchange for the creditor's general release of all claims against the debtor for
any obligations other than the note.82 Thus, the creditor released the right to
sue the debtor based on the obligations of the original debt, which was an
embezzlement claim for over $100,000.83 Ten months later, the debtor filed for
bankruptcy and attempted to discharge the promissory note as an unsecured
debt.84 The creditor objected to the discharge, alleging that the note was
obtained by fraud and constituted a nondischargeable debt under the
Bankruptcy Code.85
Responding to the creditor's claims that the novation approach had been
overruled, the West court made several important observations regarding
Maryland Casualty and its relation to the growing number of opposition cases
86from other circuits. First, West stated that the novation approach was
consistent with Greenberg v. Schools,87 a majority approach case, because the
78. Id. at 258-59.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. West v. Oltman (In re West), 22 F.3d 775,777-78 (7th Cir. 1994). For a discussion
of the West case, see infra notes 82-94 and accompanying text. Describing the novation
approach, Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook state that the minority novation approach is a
"contracts-rule-all" method, in which the underlying state contract law controls the
determination of whether a voluntary settlement agreement and release create a novation and
completely release the original tortious debt. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 13, at 16.




86. See id. at 777-78 (addressing the distinctions and similarities between the Maryland
Casualty approach and the reasoning in Brown, Greenberg, and Spicer).
87. Greenberg v. Schools, 711 F.2d 152 (1 th Cir. 1983). In Greenberg, the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether a promissory note arising out of the settlement of a
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creditor in Greenberg did not release the prior obligation, unlike the creditors
in Maryland Casualty and West.88 According to West, the "same is true of most
of the lower court decisions upon which Mr. Oltman relies: because there was
no release, the original debt was not extinguished by settlement. ,89 West stated
that the Brown decision was "immaterial" because it "addressed the preclusive
effect of a state court judgment, not a creditor's voluntary release of a debtor."90
The West court noted that only the Spicer case supported the creditor's position,
but the court refused to follow the unpersuasive reasoning in Spicer.91
The West court asserted that the novation approach encourages settlement
because a tortious debtor may be more likely to pay the injured party a greater
sum in settlement if the settlement agreement includes a general release from all
present and future claims arising from the tortious conduct at issue.92
Moreover, the enforcement of the contractual note instead of the tort claim did
not create an "inequitable result in the bankruptcy context" because the
creditor, not the debtor, "discharge[d]" the prior obligation.93 Thus, West
upheld the dischargeability of the promissory note because "no allegations of
civil action involving alleged fraud is a dischargeable debt in bankruptcy. Id. at 153. In the
1970s, Greenberg (the creditor) and Schools (the debtor) formed a corporation; however,
Greenberg later sued Schools for fraud and misappropriation of corporate funds. Id. at 153-54.
In a settlement agreement executed prior to trial, the debtor agreed to pay the creditor $100,000,
including a payment of $10,000 immediately, with the rest secured by a promissory note. Id at
154. After paying approximately half of the settlement agreement debt, the debtor defaulted on
his payments, and the creditor brought suit on the promissory note. Id. Again, the parties
reached a settlement agreement. Id. Shortly thereafter, the debtor filed for bankruptcy, and the
creditor filed an objection to the discharge of the promissory note debt. Id. The debtor claimed
that the valid settlement agreement extinguished the alleged fraud claim and that any type of
relief granted to the creditor should be limited to the enforcement of the settlement agreement.
Id. Furthermore, the debtor asserted that the exceptions to discharge should not apply because
the debt in question flowed from the settlement agreement terms and not the original obligation.
Id. In response to this argument, Greenberg stated that this type of approach would allow a
debtor to simply alter the form of a fraudulent debt to receive the discharge relief granted by the
Bankruptcy Act, and neither the Act nor the "cases construing the reach of the statute" support
this type of outcome. Id. at 154-55. Thus, Greenberg declared that the bankruptcy court
should evaluate the circumstances behind the settlement to determine whether the debt had been
obtained from actual fraudulent conduct, and if so, then the bankruptcy court should hold the
debt nondischargeable as a debt obtained by fraud. Id.
88. West v. Oltman (In re West), 22 F.3d 775, 777 (7th Cir. 1994).
89. Id.
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fraud surround the note, and the note substituted a contractual obligation for a
tortious one."94
III. Archer v. Warner: The Fourth Circuit Takes a Stand
The Fourth Circuit faced a divided field of circuit opinions when it heard
Archer v. Warner (In re Warner),95 and as expected, the Archer case forced the
Fourth Circuit to determine which approach to use. In Archer, Arlene and
Leonard Warner sold a manufacturing corporation to the Archers, and later that
year, the Archers sued the Warners for fraudulent misrepresentation during the
sale. 96 The Archers later amended the complaint to include fraud and
emotional distress, among other claims.97 Prior to litigation of these state
claims, the parties reached a settlement agreement, which provided that the
Wamers would give the Archers a lump cash payment and a $100,000
promissory note.98 In exchange, the Archers signed both a "general and mutual
release of all pending and future claims" arising out of the settled litigation."
The settlement agreement expressly stated that nothing in the agreement,
including the money settlement, should be interpreted as an admission of
wrongdoing or liability.1m
Although the Archers received the initial cash payment from the Warners,
the Warners later defaulted on the promissory note and filed for bankruptcy.10'
In response, the Archers objected to the dischargeability of the promissory note,
alleging that the debt had been obtained by fraud and was thus
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code. 02 To
provide grounds for the adversary complaint, the Archers "incorporated by
reference" in the complaint the various allegations raised in the state court
suit. °3 Arlene Warner' °4 asserted that the Archers could not resurrect the
94. Id. at 777.
95. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d 230 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 538 U.S. 314
(2003). For a discussion of the Archer decision, see infra notes 96-117 and accompanying text.




100. Id. Perhaps of less importance, "[tihere was no mention of bankruptcy in the
settlement package." Id.
101. Id. at 233-34.
102. Id. at 234.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 235 n.5. According to the Archer court, "Arlene Warner contested this issue of
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fraud claims from the original state suit because all state claims had been
completely settled.105 The bankruptcy court upheld Warner's affirmative
defense and denied the Archers' objections to discharge of the note. )06 The
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's holdings and "concluded that the
releases and settlement agreement created a novation, substituting a
dischargeable contract debt for a fraud-based tort claim."'07
In its analysis of the prepetition settlement agreement, the Fourth Circuit
discussed the circuit split and outlined the opposing viewpoints.00' The Fourth
Circuit stated that the novation approach "favors the basic principle of
encouraging settlements by way of freedom to enter into settlement agreements,
regardless of the nature of the claim subject to the settlement agreement."' 09
Without this type of contractual freedom the "incentive to settle is gone.""
l 0
Thus, the novation approach presents the "better reasoned decisions" because
Congress did not "intend... to discourage the settlement of claims."'
The Fourth Circuit chose to apply the novation theory 12 and examined the
terms of the settlement agreement to determine whether the creditors'
nondischargeability claims had been released." 13 The creditors urged the court
to examine the underlying basis for the debt, but the court insisted that the
novation theory only requires that a court analyze the "validity and
completeness of the bargained for agreement and release." 14  The court
determined that the release provisions in the settlement had released every state
law claim. 15  Therefore, the prepetition settlement "extinguished the
nondischargeability in the bankruptcy court[,]" but her husband, Leonard Warner, did not. Id.
This factor did not affect the outcome of the case. Id.
105. Id. at 235.
106. Id.
107. Id.




112. Commenting on the novation theory, the Fourth Circuit stated that "[wihile novation
is sometimes interpreted to mean the replacement of a third party to an existing contract ... we,
like the Ninth Circuit, use the term in the context of § 523(a)(2)(A) to express the substitution of
a contract claim for a tort claim through a settlement agreement." ld. at 236 n.8.
113. Id. at 236.
114. Id.
115. The general release stated that the Archers "do hereby release and forever discharge
the [Warners] from any and every right, claim, or demand... arising out of or relating to the
matter in Guilford County Superior Court, excepting only obligations under a Note and deeds of
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Archers' subsequent nondischargeability claim under Section 523(a)."' 16 The
Fourth Circuit affirmed the lower courts and upheld the dischargeable character
of the note.'
17
IV. The Supreme Court Reversal in Archer
Seeking to unify the split circuit opinions, the Supreme Court accepted the
Archer issue and handed down its Archer'18 decision in March 2003. The
Supreme Court agreed with the Fourth Circuit that the settlement agreement
released all state law claims except for the debt promised in the promissory
note; however, the Court stated that this finding did not end the inquiry." 9 The
Court further agreed that the creditor's settlement may have created a
novation.120 On the other hand, Archer stated that this possibility of novation
should not prevent the creditors from proving that the promissory note in the
settlement agreement arose out of fraud and was nondischargeable.121 The
Archer Court further stated that the main question was whether the settlement
note could also be a debt obtained by fraud, as described within the exceptions
for discharge in bankruptcy. 1
22
Analyzing the nondischargeability question, the Court stated that Brown
was the controlling precedent and, indeed, discussed at great length the
similarities between the two cases.' 23 The primary difference, according to
Archer, was that the debt in Brown was embodied in a consent judgment rather
than a settlement agreement. 24  This difference in form was not
"determinative" because a debt contained in a consent judgment is no less
obtained by fraud than a debt contained in a settlement agreement.
25
trust executed contemporaneously herewith." Id. at 237.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314 (2003). For a discussion of the Archer
case, see infra notes 119-37 and accompanying text.
119. Archer, 538 U.S. at 318-19.
120. Id. at 323.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 319.
123. Id. at 319-22. Commenting on the Archer decision, Warren and Westbrook state that,
"Justice Breyer is not deeply engaged by this fundamental tension [in the split circuit opinions].
He relies heavily on Brown v. Felsen, a 1979 case that chews up about 90 percent of his brief
discussion in Archer." Warren & Westbrook, supra note 13, at 16.
124. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314, 321 (2003).
125. Id. "The dischargeability provision applies to all debts that 'aris[e] out of' fraud. A
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The Archer Court simply stated that the validity of the Brown holding
meant that the novation theory embraced by the Fourth Circuit was wrong.
126
The Court stated that the stipulation in Brown's consent judgment created the
same kind of "novation" at issue in Archer; however, the Court in Brown held
that the bankruptcy court should examine the circumstances behind the consent
judgment to determine whether the original debt presented a valid fraud
claim.127 The Court in Archer found that if the Fourth Circuit's novation theory
had been correct, then the debt in Brown would have been dischargeable. 
128
Moreover, the Archer decision stated that the policy language in Brown
favored the Archers' claims for nondischargeability.129 In particular, the
Court referred to the following statement from Brown: "[T]he mere fact that
a conscientious creditor has previously reduced his claim to judgment should
not bar further inquiry into the true nature of the debt."130 The Archer Court
asserted that the substitution of "settlement" for "judgment" in this statement
aptly described the Archer case. 31 In addition, Archer embraced Brown's
reasoning that the substitution of the word "judgments" for "liabilities" in the
Bankruptcy Code meant that Congress intended the broadest range of inquiry
concerning potentially nondischargeable debts. 132 This determination should
occur in the bankruptcy court because the bankruptcy and dischargeability
issues "'are not directly in issue [in state litigation] and neither party has a full
incentive to litigate them.'" 33 Archer did not address the additional grounds
debt embodied in the settlement of a fraud case 'arises' no less 'out of' the underlying fraud
than a debt embodied in a stipulation and consent decree." Id. (citations omitted); see infra
notes 154-60 and accompanying text (comparing consent judgments and voluntary settlement
agreements and discussing whether the differences are "determinative" in Archer).
126. Archer, 538 U.S. at 320. Explaining why the Brown decision invalidates the novation
theory, the Court stated:
The reduction of Brown's state-court fraud claim to a stipulation (embodied in a
consent decree) worked the same kind of novation as the "novation" at issue
here .... Yet, in Brown, this Court held that the Bankruptcy Court should look





129. Id. at 320-21.
130. Id. (quoting Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138 (1979)).
131. Id. at321.
132. Id
133. Id. (quoting Brown, 442 U.S. at 134).
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of judgment raised by Warner because "the Court of Appeals did not
determine the merits of either argument, both of which are, in any event,
outside the scope of the question presented and insufficiently addressed
below."'134 The Court reversed and remanded the case, permitting the Fourth
Circuit to determine whether the alternative grounds for judgment raised by
Warner were meritorious.
35
The remaining question is whether Archer successfully resolves the
heavily debated novation issue and circuit split, or if Archer creates a
contractual quagmire for parties seeking to settle a fraud-related claim.
According to Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook, both critics of Archer, the
"Supreme Court has now settled an important (and hotly disputed) question
about the binding effect of settlements-and they came out with a distinctly
not-binding tilt., 136  Other scholars have noted that the Supreme Court
"waffled" in this decision because the Court "soundly rejected the novation
theory as applied by the Fourth Circuit, but then acknowledged that the
settlement agreement and releases 'may have worked a kind of novation.'
137
134. Id. at 322. Warner raised the following alternative arguments, which the Supreme
Court refused to address:
[Warner] says that the settlement agreement and releases not only worked a
novation by converting potential tort liabilities into a contract debt, but also
included a promise that the Archers would not make the present claim of
nondischargeability for fraud. She adds that, in any event, because the Archers
dismissed the original fraud action with prejudice, North Carolina law [jurisdiction
of the original state fraud claim] treats the fraud issue as having been litigated and
determined in her favor, thereby barring the Archers from making their present
claim on grounds of collateral estoppel.
Id.
135. Id. at 322-23. If the Supreme Court has remanded the case for the Fourth Circuit to
make a determination about the collateral estoppel argument and whether the settlement had
preclusive intent, then the creditors are still in danger of losing the settlement. According to
Rebecca Callahan and Lisa Mathaisel:
[B]ecause the Court declined to address the collateral estoppel argument raised by
the debtor with respect to the legal effect of a dismissal with prejudice filed in
connection with the settlement of a fraud claim, and gave the Fourth Circuit free
reign, on remand, to determine this issue if properly raised and preserved, it is not
clear whether the ability to maintain a Section 523 action will be meaningful in
terms of a creditor's ability to ultimately have the settlement obligation excepted
from discharge.
Rebecca Callahan & Lisa Mathaisel, Contracting Around the Debt Discharge Under Section
523(a)(2)(A), 27 CAL. BANKR. J. 40, 51 (2003).
136. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 13, at 16.
137. Callahan & Mathaisel, supra note 135, at 50. Discussing the effects of the Archer
decision, Callahan and Mathaisel note the following:
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The Supreme Court in Archer left unanswered a variety of questions and raised
other concerns, such as the freedom to create lasting and effective contractual
releases, which the following Part discusses.
V. Analyzing Archer: Did the Supreme Court Make the Right Choice?
This Part explores the issues in Archer and the unanswered questions
raised by this decision. The dissenting opinion in Archer is the starting point
for this discussion, and the dissent asserted that the majority overlooked the
critical difference between Archer and Brown. This Part asserts that Brown
was not the proper governing precedent and that the Court ignored the
important public policy that encourages settlements. In addition, Archer failed
to address the Burner principle, which requires a uniform outcome in
bankruptcy and state court proceedings to prevent forum shopping. This Part
also suggests that counsel for both parties may be at fault for the failed
settlement agreement and the Supreme Court's reversal of the Fourth Circuit's
decision. This analysis concludes that Archer failed to create a lasting circuit
split resolution and may have created a contractual quagmire for settled fraud
claims in bankruptcy.
A. The Dissent Speaks Out
In responding to the arguments of the majority opinion, the dissent
(Justices Thomas and Stevens) focused on the factors that set Archer apart
from Brown and asserted that the Court should have reached a different
outcome given the contractual arrangement in Archer.138 The majority
claimed that "no significant difference" existed between Brown and Archer;
however, the dissent argued that "the blanket release" in Archer was a
The Archer decision offers little guidance as to what the creditor must do to obtain
a judgment for nondischargeable debt other than to suggest that the simple
inclusion of a statement in the settlement agreement that the debtor's obligations
thereunder arise from settlement of a fraud claim might be enough to bring the
obligations within the exception provisions of Section 523(a)(2)(A) .... Archer
also leaves unanswered the question as to what legal effect should be given to
settlement agreements which resolve fraud claims but are silent on issues of fraud
and debt discharge or how the lower courts should deal with those issues once the
Section 523 action is filed.
Id. at 50-51.
138. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314, 323-25 (2003) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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"critical difference" between Archer and the consent judgment at issue in
Brown. 139 Indeed, the Archer release clearly illustrated that the parties
intended to settle not only issues relating to alleged fraud but also any other
claims relating to the state litigation except for the promissory note
embodied in the agreement. 140 The dissent stated that the circumstances in
Archer aligned with West and the novation theory.1 41 Thus, according to
the dissent, Brown was not the proper governing precedent for the
particular set of circumstances in Archer.
42
Building upon this argument, the dissent stated that a creditor must
present a "causal nexus between the fraud and debt" to prove that a debt is
139. Id. at 324 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In addition, Justice Thomas stated, "[b]ased on the
sweeping language of the general release, it is inaccurate for the Court to say that the parties did
not 'resolve the issue of fraud."' Id. at 325 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
140. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In contrast, the consent judgment in Brown did not
include an express release of the all claims arising from the original obligation. Brown v. Felsen
(In re Brown), 442 U.S. 127, 128 (1979).
Moreover, the right to object to the dischargeability of a debt under § 523(a)(2) is a right
that creditors may waive. Respondent's Brief at 31-32, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003)
(No. 01-1418). According to the Bankruptcy Code, a creditor has sixty days after the first
meeting of creditors to request a dischargeability hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c)(1) (2000). If the
creditor does not request the hearing within that time period, the creditor forfeits the claim. Id.
The creditor does not forfeit the right to object to dischargeability for all debts under this
provision. Instead, the forfeiture described in § 523(c)(1) applies only to the dischargeability
exceptions described in §§ 523(a)(2), (4), (6), and (15). Id. Given this guideline in the
Bankruptcy Code, "presumably, creditors may choose... to forgo 'an assertion of
nondischargeability. There is no suggestion anywhere in the Code that the bankruptcy court has
either the power or the duty to override that choice." Respondent's Brief at 31-32, Archer v.
Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-1418). The dissent in Archer asserted that "petitioners
[Archers] have failed to point to any provision of the Bankruptcy Code that specifically bars a
creditor from entering into an agreement that impairs its right to contest dischargeability."
Archer, 538 U.S. at 327 n.2 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Thus, the releases in Archer were not
inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code because, as noted in the West decision, the creditor---not
the debtor-has voluntarily discharged the prior obligation. See supra notes 78-90 (describing
the West court's reasoning and decision).
141. Referring to West, the dissent stated the following:
The parties here executed a blanket release, rather than entered into a consent
judgment. And in my view, "if it is shown that [a] note was given and received as
payment or waiver of the original debt and the parties agreed that the note was to
substitute a new obligation for the old, the note fully discharges the original debt,
and the nondischargeability of the original debt does not affect the dischargeability
of the obligation under the note." That is the case before us, and, accordingly,
Brown does not control our disposition of this matter.
Archer, 538 U.S. at 324 (Thnomas, J., dissenting) (quoting West v. Oltman (In re West), 22 F.3d
775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994)).
142. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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nondischargeable in bankruptcy.143 The causal nexus can be severed by
"certain intervening events--otherwise called superseding causes" that in
turn "cut off all liability,"'44 and the settlement agreement served as such a
superseding event.145 As a result, the only debt left to bankruptcy had not
been obtained by fraudulent conduct but rather was the result of an
informed and voluntary action by the parties.146
The creditors' actions throughout the litigation process further
supported this conclusion. 47 The creditors relied on the fixed sum in the
settlement agreement as their stated recovery, rather than the significantly
higher amount of damages that had been alleged during the state fraud
proceedings. 148 The dissent asserted that "this crucial fact demonstrates
that petitioners [the creditors] seek to recover a debt based only in contract,
not in fraud." 149 The majority did not explain why it permitted the creditors
to use the promissory note amount for the "debt they seek to recover but not
for the character of the debt."1 50 The dissent stated that neither precedent
nor the Bankruptcy Code sanctions such a discriminatory implementation
of a contractual agreement.' 51
143. Id. at 325 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 326 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Exxon Co., U.S.A. v. Sofec, Inc., 517 U.S.
830, 837 (1996)).
145. Id. at 327 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
146. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). In support of this argument, the dissent noted:
Petitioners' own actions in the course of this litigation support this conclusion.
Throughout the proceedings below and continuing in this Court, petitioners have
sought to recover only the amount of the debt set forth in the settlement agreement,
which is lower than the total damages they allegedly suffered as a result of
respondent's alleged fraud.
Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
147. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
148. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
150. Id. at 328 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
151. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Discussing this point, Warren and Westbrook state that
the situation might be described in the following manner:
The majority opinion suggests that someone may pay $50 for a dog and his bowl,
but discover that the law says that all he bought was the bowl. So someone settling
a claim may believe that he is settling both the kind of claim and the dollar value,
only to discover that the court says only the dollar value was settled. The majority
in Archer says the dog (dischargeability) is never for sale. People who like to do
everything by contracts would think that is a pretty lousy outcome. In that sense,
Justice Breyer's opinion is very important. It suggests that those bankruptcy
principles are bedrock-and that they override contractual arrangements to the
contrary.
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B. Is Brown the Proper Governing Precedent?
As the Archer dissent noted, the use of Brown as the governing
precedent in Archer is not a decision immune from criticism.' 52 One of the
primary differences between Archer and Brown is that Brown focused on a
debt embodied in a consent judgment and the principles of res judicata, as
opposed to the expressed mutual and general releases included in the
Archer settlement agreement. 53 Thus, a central question is whether the
consent judgment and the settlement agreement are synonymous. If the two
are synonymous, how can the majority reconcile the general and mutual
releases in Archer with the expressed lack thereof in Brown?
A consent judgment is entered by a court with the mutual agreement of
the parties to execute the settlement of an action. 54 Despite the contractual
characteristics of a consent judgment, it is not "simply a contract entered
into between private parties seeking to effectuate parochial concerns," but a
"judicial act." 155 The Supreme Court has recognized that "consent decrees
'have attributes both of contracts and of judicial decrees,' a dual character
that has resulted in different treatment for different purposes."'
156
Furthermore, parties may prefer to settle their conflicts by consent
judgment rather than by a private settlement agreement because of certain
advantages, such as it is "easier to obtain enforcement of a consent decree
because it will be unnecessary to prove many facts that would otherwise
have to be shown in order to establish the validity of an ordinary
contract."1
57
Warren & Westbrook, supra note 13, at 16.
152. See supra notes 138-51 and accompanying text (describing the dissenting opinion in
Archer).
153. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (stating that the Supreme Court in
Archer found that the primary difference between Archer and Brown was that the debt in Brown
was embodied in a consent judgment rather than a settlement agreement).
154. 46 AM. JUR. 2d Judgments § 207 (1994). "Although a consent decree embodies or
represents an agreement of the parties, and thus in some respects is contractual in nature, it is an
agreement.., that is subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees."
Id.
155. Id.
156. Local Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501,519
(1986) (quoting United States v. IT Cont'l Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 235-37 (1975)).
157. Id. at 524 n.13 (quoting Brief for National League of Cities etal. asAmici Curiae 25).
In addition, the following advantages stem from a consent judgment as opposed to a private
settlement agreement:
A court that maintains continuing jurisdiction over a consent decree will have a
more flexible repertoire of enforcement measures. And it is likely to be easier to
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As a hybrid of judgments and contract settlements, the consent
judgment is not interchangeable with a settlement agreement.'58 Indeed,
the consent judgment or decree "has the attributes of a judicial order
because it is entered by a court, is enforceable by citation for contempt of
court and may be modified in certain circumstances even over the
objections of a party." 59  Despite the dissimilarities in creation,
enforcement, and modification of the two types of agreements, the Court in
Archer stated that the difference in form was not "determinative.
'' 60
Warren and Westbrook state that a distinction between settlement
agreements and consent judgments may be "sustained on the policy ground
that we trust state court process, but we do not trust state courts to be careful
about the bankruptcy implications of a state consent judgment or settlement
contract."' 61 The state courts may have sufficient cause to be cautious about
the settlement of an alleged fraud claim, but "the settlement recitals that would
preclude discharge under § 523 are largely irrelevant under state law, so we
can't expect state judges to police the process for the protection of debtors or
of creditors like the Archers."'' 62 Indeed, the intricacies of a settlement
agreement that would protect a creditor or debtor in bankruptcy present a
complex matter that can be handled more effectively in a private settlement
agreement. Because contracting parties may possess a greater deal of expertise
with these types of issues and may place greater care into the creation of a
settlement agreement, the courts may properly view the settlement agreement in
a different light than the consent judgment.'
63
channel litigation concerning the validity and implications of a consent decree into
a single forum---4he court that entered the decree--thus avoiding the waste of
resources and the risk of inconsistent or conflicting obligations.
Id. (quoting Brief for National League of Cities et al. as Amici Curiae 25).
158. See id. at 519 (describing the "hybrid nature" of consent judgments and discussing
whether consent judgments require the same treatment as judicial orders).
159. Robert V. Percival, The Bounds of Consent: Consent Decrees, Settlements and
Federal Environmental Policy Making, 1987 U. CH. LEGAL FORUM 327, 334.
160. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text (discussing the Archer Court's
statement that the differences between a consent judgment and settlement agreement were not
"determinative").
161. Warren & Westbrook, supra note 13, at 61.
162. Id.
163. See supra note 156 and accompanying text (stating that consent judgments and
settlement agreements have varying characteristics that permit different treatment for different
purposes).
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Another pertinent factor to consider is whether the blanket release in
Archer creates an irreconcilable chasm between Brown and Archer.
164
Notably, "a general release, not restricted by its terms to particular claims or
demands, ordinarily covers all claims and demands due at the time of its
execution which were within the contemplation of the parties." 165 The Archer
settlement contained both a mutual and a general release of all claims
underlying the state litigation, whereas the consent judgment in Brown did not
include any type of release.16 Attempting to synthesize the two cases, the
Court stated that res judicata in Brown provided the same type of "blanket
release" found in the Archer settlement agreement. 
167
The Archer Court further stated that the releases failed to establish that the
"parties meant to resolve the issue of fraud," even though the Court agreed with
the Fourth Circuit that the agreement fully released each and every state claim
except for the promissory note.168 Neither release provision specifically stated
"fraud" as a released claim; however, the general release did refer to any
"'right[s], claim[s], or demand[s]' related to the state-court litigation 'excepting
only obligations under [the] Note and deeds of trust."' 169 This type of general
release includes all claims and demands-that are within the contemplation of the
parties at the time of execution of the settlement agreement. 170 Subsequently,
the Archer fraud claim falls into this category of released claims. The Brown
consent judgment did not contain a similar provision, nor does res judicata
sufficiently fulfill the same role as a contractual release.
171
164. According to Justice Thomas's dissent in Archer, the Supreme Court "fail[ed] to
address" the blanket release in the Archer settlement agreement, which Thomas viewed as a
"critical difference" between Archer and Brown. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S.
314, 324 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
165. 66 AM. JUR. 2d Release § 28 (2001). In addition, "[a] 'general release' not only
settles enumerated specific differences but claims of every kind or character, known and
unknown." Id. at n.l (citing Zandford v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 112 F.3d 723 (4th Cir.
1997)).
166. See Archer, 538 U.S. at 318-22 (discussing the Archer settlement agreement and
comparing it to the consent judgment in Brown).
167. Id. at 321.
168. Id. at 322.
169. Id. at 324 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting the Archer settlement agreement, App.
67).
170. See supra note 165 and accompanying text (discussing the scope of a general release).
171. Analyzing the general release in the Archer settlement agreement, Justice Thomas
stated that the release served as the "critical difference" between Archer and Brown. Archer
v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314, 324 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Furthermore,
Justice Thomas found that Brown did not "address the question presented in the case-whether a
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The Brown decision lacks applicability to Archer.172 The contractual
aspects of Archer have far-reaching consequences that should not be interpreted
from the perspective of Brown, a res judicata decision that circuits adopting the
novation approach failed to find controlling or even applicable. 173 Furthermore,
a member of the Court noted in the closing of oral arguments in Archer that
"there's nobody in the room to defend the position that.., was taken by the
question presented, namely that a novation-a novation is all you need. I think
that's, at least, an arguable position, but.., nobody seems to want to...
discuss the issue on... which we took the case.', 174 The matter at issue in
Archer is novation, and Brown does not mention this concept, discuss the
approach taken by circuits that apply the novation theory, or even discuss the
proper construction of contractual releases within the bankruptcy context. 175 As
such, Brown is not the proper governing precedent for Archer, even though the
two situations may possess similarities.
C. Settlement Incentives and Public Policy: What Happens After Archer?
The Fourth Circuit's decision in Archer emphasized the public policy
supporting settlements, but the Supreme Court did not discuss the relevance of
this policy or analyze Archer under this public policy framework. 176 The law
encourages settlement by parties in conflict "in the interests of alleviating
discord and promoting certainty.., first, by enforcing promises made to
claimants in settlement of their claims; and second, by foreclosing any action
creditor may, without the participation of the state court, completely release a debtor," from
all claims arising out of a "state-court fraud action." Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
172. Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
173. See, e.g., Key Bar Invs., Inc. v. Fischer (In re Fischer), 116 F. 3d 388, 390-91 (9th
Cir. 1997) (stating that "these 'res judicata' cases [referring to Brown] do not control our case,
which involves a voluntary agreement between two parties that created a novation, releasing
either side from liability arising from the original contract").
174. Oral Argument Transcript at 56-57, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-
1418). The Archers and Warner both spoke briefly on novation when the Supreme Court
Justices asked about the issue; however, Warner relied largely on an issue preclusion argument.
Neither party argued that novation alone barred the bankruptcy court from looking behind the
settlement agreement. Responding to the Court's statement that no one in the room wanted to
discuss novation, the Archers stated, "we agree, as we say in our reply brief, that the principal
basis of the decision below has been abandoned by [Warner] here." Id. at 57.
175. See supra note 54 (noting that Brown does not address the issue of novation in which
a contractual obligation could completely discharge the original tort debt).
176. The majority opinion in Archer did not include any references to the public policy that
encourages settlements and the enforcement thereof of valid settlements. Archer, 538 U.S. at
316-23.
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by the claimant on the claim that has been settled."'1 Settlement also serves a
vital role within the bankruptcy process.17 8 Furthermore, one of the main
considerations underlying the novation line of cases is the public policy in favor
of settlement agreements.179 The novation approach, according to the Fourth
Circuit, encourages settlement by supporting the freedom to enter into
contractual agreements "regardless of the nature of the claim subject to the
settlement agreement.' 8 0 Otherwise, the underlying motivation to settle is
gone.
81
Given that settlement by disputing parties is encouraged by the courts,
why did the Supreme Court not consider this policy in Archer? As noted by
Reynaldo Valencia, "[sluch negotiated outcomes save the bankruptcy estate the
time and expense of protracted proceedings, perhaps even litigation, regarding
the disputed issue or issues."' 8 2  Yet the Court did not analyze how the
ineffectiveness of contractual releases in bankruptcy might affect debtors'
reactions to settlement offers from creditors in the future.'8 3 What incentive
177. FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 2.12. In addition:
[T]his policy [in favor of settlements] supports the enforceability of a promise made
to a claimant that is willing to settle a disputed claim, even if the claim later turns
out to be invalid. The same policy suggests that a claimant who has settled a claim
should be foreclosed from later pursuing it in violation of the settlement agreement.
Id. § 4.23.
178. See Reynaldo Valencia, The Sanctity of Settlements and the Significance of Court
Approval: Discerning Clarity from Bankruptcy Rule 9019, 78 OR. L. REV. 425,430-31 (1999)
(discussing the importance of settlement within bankruptcy). Explaining the importance of
settlements and compromise in bankruptcy, Valencia states that:
The courts are uniform in their respect, desire, and appreciation of settlements in a
bankruptcy case. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has noted, "[i]n
administering reorganization proceedings in an economical and practical manner it
will often be wise to arrange the settlement of claims as to which there are
substantial and reasonable doubts." The leading bankruptcy treatise, Collier on
Bankruptcy, similarly notes that "[c]ompromises are favored in bankruptcy .. "
Id. (citations omitted); see also Michael & Pacewicz, supra note 9, at 643 (noting that
"[c]ompromise is the linchpin of bankruptcy practice... [w]ithout it, the business of the
bankruptcy courts would slow considerably, if not come to a screeching halt").
179. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (noting the importance of
encouraging settlement and compromise).
180. Archer v. Warner (In reWamer), 283 F.3d 230,236(4th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 538 U.S.
314 (2003).
181. Id.
182. Valencia, supra note 178, at 430 (citations omitted).
183. The Court did not expressly say that the releases have no validity in bankruptcy;
however, the Court stated that the settlement agreement-including the releases-did not
resolve the issue of fraud or show the parties' intent to release the fraud claims. In other words,
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does a debtor have to settle with a creditor if the promised release from the
creditor fails to protect the debtor from the resurrection of fully released
claims?'84 AfterArcher, the creditor might have an added incentive to agree to
release all claims in exchange for a fixed sum because the settlement will be
upheld in bankruptcy proceedings while the content and purposes of the general
releases will be ignored. Has the Court increased the probability that debtors
and creditors alike will pursue litigation until final judgment because voluntary
contractual agreements have been selectively applied in Archer?
D. Does Archer Encourage Forum Shopping?
Another unanswered question that arises from the Supreme Court's
decision in Archer is whether the Court's decision will increase forum
shopping. This problem occurs because bankruptcy provides a separate forum
apart from state courts for the enforcement of debt collection and possibly a
different outcome than a state collection suit. 185  The concept of forum
shopping "is commonly defined as attempting to have one's case heard in the
forum where it has the greatest chance of success" and is largely based on the
subjective intent of the parties.18 6 Thus, if a creditor foresees a more favorable
outcome in debt collection proceedings in the federal bankruptcy court versus
the Court may have ruled the broad and general language of the releases ineffective against the
fraud claim in the bankruptcy context even though a state court would likely hold that the
releases covered all of the state claims, including fraud. According to Warren and Westbrook:
Whether he says so explicitly or not, Justice Breyer [writer of the majority opinion
in Archer] is taking a position on the role contracts may play to get around the rules
of bankruptcy. We wonder if it might work the other way-that is, what if the
debtor wants to get out of any pre-bankruptcy deal that affects basic bankruptcy
principles?
Warren & Westbrook, supra note 13, at 61.
184. See Aungst, supra note 72, at 15 (noting that "[i]f the claim remains
nondischargeable, despite a clear settlement agreement to the contrary, the nearly bankrupt
debtor has little incentive to settle").
185. See Douglas G. Baird, Loss Distribution, Forum Shopping, and Bankruptcy: A Reply
to Warren, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 815, 824-26 (1987) (examining the problems of forum shopping
within bankruptcy and stating that "the existence of the two courthouses [two different forums
for enforcement of debt collection] does not mean that substantive legal questions should be
treated differently in the two places"); William J. Burnett, Prepetition Waivers of the Automatic
Stay: Automatic Enforcement Equals Automatic Trouble, 5 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 257, 261
(1996) (stating that creditors' rights as created by nonbankruptcy law "should be respected in
federal bankruptcies, because failure to do so could lead to forum shopping").
186. Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 11, 14.
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state court, the creditor may attempt to force the debtor into involuntary
bankruptcy to enjoy the benefits of the favorable outcome that was not
available in state court proceedings.
187
Forum shopping within bankruptcy is a problem recognized by the courts,
as illustrated by Butner v. United States.'88 In Butner, the Supreme Court held
that nonbankruptcy law determines property interests in bankruptcy and stated
that "the federal bankruptcy court should take whatever steps are necessary to
ensure that the mortgagee is afforded in federal bankruptcy court the same
protection he would have under state law if no bankruptcy had ensued."'
189
Butner stressed that bankruptcy courts should not deviate from nonbankruptcy
rules unless bankruptcy policies demand a different outcome. 19 As a result,
bankruptcy courts have a responsibility to follow state substantive law to
187. See Davis v. Davis (In re Davis), 170 F.3d 475,481 (5th Cir. 1999) (discussing the
petitioner's proposed interpretation of § 522(c) of the Bankruptcy Code and stating that "the
impact of such a construction would put the preferred creditors in a better position after the
debtor has filed bankruptcy than before and may create an incentive for filing involuntary
bankruptcies"). In addition, Davis stated that the proper interpretation of the Bankruptcy Code
section at issue allows creditors "holding such claims to proceed against the property after
bankruptcy based on the rights and remedies they would have had under state law if bankruptcy
had not been filed." Id.
188. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). In Burner, the Supreme Court
considered whether a mortgagee's rights to rent and profits from the property of the bankrupt
mortgagor's estate should be determined according to state law even though the decision had
fallen into the federal bankruptcy court. Id. at 49. The dispute arose between the bankruptcy
trustee who had been appointed to collect all rents from the property and the mortgagee who
claimed the right to the collected funds. Id. at 49-51. Analyzing the facts of the case, the
Supreme Court asserted that the "minority of courts which have rejected state law have not done
so because of any congressional command... [riather, they have adopted a uniform federal
approach to the question." Id. at 55. Despite this intention, the Court stated that property
interests are "created and defined by state law," and "[u]niform treatment of property ... within
a State serves to reduce uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping." Id. Thus, the Court in
Butner found that the federal bankruptcy court has a duty to "ensure that the mortgagee is
afforded in federal bankruptcy court the same protection he would have under state law if no
bankruptcy had ensued." Id. at 56. Furthermore, the federal bankruptcy courts should not
analyze the property interests under a guide other than state law unless "some federal interest
requires a different result." Id. at 55.
189. Id. at 56. Supporting this decision, the Supreme Court asserted that "[u]niform
treatment of property interests by both state and federal courts within a State serves to reduce
uncertainty, to discourage forum shopping, and to prevent a party from receiving 'a windfall
merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy."' Id. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat'l
Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609 (1961)); see also Raleigh v. I11. Dep't of Revenue, 530 U.S. 15, 20
(2000) (stating that "the 'basic federal rule' in bankruptcy is that state law governs the substance
of claims"); In re Jason Realty, 59 F.3d 423,427 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that a "federal court in
bankruptcy is not allowed to upend the property law of the state in which it sits, for to do so
would encourage forum shopping").
190. Burner, 440 U.S. at 55.
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ensure that parties receive the same protection within bankruptcy that they
would have received under state law.'
91
The Court in Archer neither discussed the forum shopping problem nor
analyzed the settlement as a state-controlled issue; however, the interpretation
of the settlement agreement presented contract rights that should have been
determined according to state law. 92 Consequently, the Supreme Court should
have recognized the general and mutual releases as discharging "all and sundry
claims between the parties." 193 As noted previously, basic contract law favors
the settlement of claims and, in turn, the enforcement of promises made within
mutual and voluntary agreements, which "suggests that a claimant who had
settled a claim should be foreclosed from later pursuing it in violation of the
settlement agreement."' 194  Moreover, the novation at issue in Archer
represented a substituted contract that had the effect of discharging the original
tort claim and replacing it with a new contractual obligation. 95 The creditor,
191. See G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 227, 239-40 (2000) (stating that "substantive rules must survive across the
bankruptcy membrane if the forum shopping problem is to. be avoided" and that the Butner
principle requires that the law that controls rights outside of bankruptcy should also control
those rights within bankruptcy).
192. According to Steven L. Schwarcz, the Supreme Court's logic in Butner appears to
apply not only to property rights but also to state law contract rights, even though there are no
cases exactly on point. Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 576-77. Furthermore:
[U]niform treatment of contracts likewise would reduce uncertainty and would
prevent a debtor from receiving a windfall merely by filing bankruptcy to impair
rights under those contracts .... Furthermore, property is merely a bundle of
rights, and it would be inconsistent to treat unbundled rights, such as contract
rights, differently from bundled rights for purposes of this analysis.
Id. (citing In re Columbia Gas Sys. Inc., 50 F.3d 233,241 (3d Cir. 1995)); In re Streets & Beard
Farm P'ship, 882 F.2d 233, 235 (7th Cir. 1989)).
193. McGladrey, Hendrickson & Pullen v. Sytek Fin. Corp., 375 S.E.2d 689, 691 (N.C. Ct. App.
1989) (citing Merrinmon v. The Postal Tel.-Cable Co., 176 S.E. 246 (1934)); see also Chaplin v.
Nationscredit Corp., 307 F.3d 368, 373 (5th Cir. 2002) (discussing the merits of "plain and simple"
statements of release within settlement agreements and the effects thereof). Noting the importance of
simple release statements, the Chaplin court stated:
[A] rule allowing litigants to settle all claims with a plain and simple statement that the
release covers any and all claims reduces transaction costs, puts sophisticated and
unsophisticated litigants alike on equal footing, and adds certainty to settlement
negotiations and agreements .... In short, a general release of "any and all" claims
applies to all possible causes of action, unless a statute specifically and expressly requires
a release to mention the statute for the release to bar a cause of action under the statute.
Id
194. FARNSWORTi, supra note 7, § 4.23.
195. See id. § 4.24 (discussing the concept of a substituted contract); see also PERILLO,
supra note 5, § 21.8 ("A novation is a substituted contract which operates immediately to
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therefore, has no right to enforce the original tort claim but is instead limited to
the remedies available under the substituted contract.'96
The Archers' available remedies were limited to the enforcement of the
promissory note, as explicitly stated in the settlement agreement. 97 Both the
general and mutual releases barred further litigation of any fraud allegations
arising from the original debt-sale of the manufacturing company. 198 The
Supreme Court's failure to implement state substantive law in Archer
produced a result that would not have occurred in a state court forum and
illustrated a clear violation of the Butner principle. 199
On the other hand, Butner, while emphasizing the importance of
uniform outcomes in the state and bankruptcy forums, authorizes
bankruptcy courts to override state law if a "federal interest" necessitates a
different outcome. 200 The federal interest standard, however, is vague and
presents the perplexing question of what constitutes a federal interest
sufficient to override the Butner principle.
20 1 Davis v. Davis (In re Davis) 20
2
suggested that parties may have difficulty satisfying the federal interest,
short of federal pre-emption.2 °3 According to the Davis court, the
discharge an obligation.").
196. PERILLO, supra note 5, § 21.8.
197. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314, 317 (2003).
198. Id.
199. See supra Part IV (discussing the Supreme Court's decision and treatment of the
contract issues in Archer).
200. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
201. See Schwarcz, supra note 3, at 577-78 (stating that the Butner principle allows
bankruptcy courts to override state property law if a federal interest exists, although the
Supreme Court did not define this standard, and noting that the Bankruptcy Code's "policy of
equality of distribution surely should qualify").
202. Davis v. Davis (In re Davis), 170 F.3d 475 (5th Cir. 1999). In Davis, the Fifth Circuit
considered whether § 522(c)(1) pre-empted Texas exemption statutes or could be interpreted to
override the exemption provision to satisfy a nondischargeable child support and alimony
judgment. Id. at 477. The debtor in Davis filed for bankruptcy and claimed his Texas home as
an exemption. Id. The creditor objected to the exemption of the Texas homestead and argued
that § 522(c)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code pre-empted the Texas exemption statute. Id. The
Davis court stated that exemption of property plays an important role within the bankruptcy
context and, as such, is a "closely guarded" right that is largely defined by state law. Id. at 478-
79. The court rejected the creditor's interpretation of § 522(c)(1) because that interpretation
would place preferred creditors in a better position after the debtor had filed for bankruptcy
than before that point. Id. at 481. The Davis court further held that § 522(c)(1) did not directly
conflict with the Texas exemption statute and that the creditor's policy argument (enforcement
of family support obligations) did not provide sufficient evidence of implied preemption. Id. at
482. Thus, Davis upheld the debtor's homestead exemption under Texas law. Id. at 483.
203. See id. at 481-83 (discussing the difficulty of reaching the federal interest standard).
According to the Davis court, the argument asserted by the creditor fails for a number of
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traditional areas of state police power, such as property law, are
presumptively reserved to the states unless Congress acts with a "clear and
manifest purpose" to override the state law or the state law irreconcilably
conflicts with federal law. 2°4 The court denied the petitioner's pre-emption
argument because the Bankruptcy Code did not directly conflict with the
Texas exemption statute. 20 5 The Davis court stated that giving effect to the
creditor's interpretation of Section 522(c)(1) would have denied the debtor
the exemptions permitted outside of bankruptcy and possibly deterred a
debtor from seeking relief in bankruptcy. 2°6 Analyzing this possible effect,
Davis stated that "Congress surely would not have reached this
consequential result without legislating more explicitly. ,207
The circumstances in Archer do not present a pre-emption argument or
a federal interest of such weight to override the Butner principle. Issuing a
decision adverse to a possible state holding on the same issue, the Supreme
Court in Archer created a contractual quagmire that fails to provide debtors
the same protection they would have received outside of bankruptcy. The
Court created an incentive for creditors involved in the settlement of
alleged fraud claims to petition for involuntary bankruptcy. Under Archer,
creditors may be able to take advantage of a fixed payment from the
settlement in bankruptcy while proving nondischargeability of settlements
with previously released state claims.2 °8 Archer exacerbates the forum
reasons, including that: "In effect, Sandra's [creditor] proffered construction of § 522(c) does
not merely withhold any special protection offered by bankruptcy law, but overrides
nonbankruptcy law and has the effect of denying the debtor even exemptions that would have
been available outside of bankruptcy." Id. at 481.
204. Id. at 481-82.
205. Id. at 482.
206. Id. at 481.
207. Id.
208. See LYNN M. LoPucKi, STRATEGIES FOR CREDITORS IN BANKRuPTcY PROCEEDINGS
§ 2.08 (3d ed. 1997) (describing the "strategic implications" of involuntary bankruptcy,
including the possible benefits of controlling venue). Although creditors have the option of
pursuing an "involuntary" bankruptcy claim, LoPucki states that "it is seldom in their interests to
do so." Id. Moreover, an unsuccessful involuntary bankruptcy petition can result in liability for
damages against the petitioning creditors. Id. Despite these risks, LoPucki states that "there are
strategic uses of involuntary bankruptcy that may justify the risks," and one such strategic use is
"controlling venue." Id. Indeed, LoPucki notes that "the statutes governing venue of bankruptcy
cases are highly permissive and forum shopping is rampant." Id. On the other hand, the
percentage of "bankruptcy proceedings" that are "commenced by creditors" is about "one half of
1 percent." Id. § 2.08 n.120. For an example of a bankruptcy case in which the court
entered a judgment for damages against a creditor for filing an involuntary bankruptcy
petition in bad faith, see In re John Richards Homes Building Co., 298 B.R. 591 (Bankr.
S.D. Mich. 2003). In John Richards Homes Building Co., the bankruptcy court entered damages
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shopping problem rather than addressing the issue or recognizing the
necessity of uniform outcomes between state and bankruptcy courts.
E. How Does the "Honest But Unfortunate Debtor" Policy
Affect Archer?
The "honest but unfortunate debtor" policy within bankruptcy, as
defined by Spicer, means that the "fresh start" offered to the debtor through
the discharge of debts is not absolute, but is limited to the "honest"
debtor.2°  Indeed, the Spicer court stated that Section 523(a)(2)(A)
effectuates this policy by denying discharge to all debts obtained by fraud,
a position supported by other statutory exceptions that bar discharge in
bankruptcy for wrongful conduct.210 The Brown Court, using a similar
argument, stated that when seeking discharge of their debts, debtors place
their prior dealings "squarely in issue" because the Bankruptcy Code limits
relief to the honest but unfortunate debtor. 21' Because the Supreme Court
relied on Brown as the governing precedent in Archer, a thorough analysis
of Archer and the novation theory requires a discussion of this bankruptcy
policy.
212
The first question is whether the Fourth Circuit's decision in Archer is
consistent with the honest debtor policy. The fraud claims against the
Warners were not established.2t 3 The Warners and Archers voluntarily
settled the claims of fraud and expressly agreed not to raise any further
against the creditor for over $6,000,000. Id. at 593.
209. United States v. Spicer (In re Spicer), 57 F. 3d 1152,1156-57 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
210. Id; see also 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4) (2000) (providing that debts "for fraud or defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny" are nondischargeable); 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6) (2000) (stating that debts incurred by "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another
entity" are nondischargeable).
211. Brown v. Felsen (In re Brown), 442 U.S. 127, 128 (1979); see also Anthony Michael
Sabino, Preventing an Alchemy of Evil: Preserving the Nondischargeability of a Debt Obtained by
Fraud, 12 J. BANKR. L. & PRAc. 99, 99-100 (2003) (describing the "paramount" importance of the
"honest" debtor policy to bankruptcy and claiming that the discharge exceptions in the Bankruptcy
Code are "precepts... cemented in even firmer ground; the dictates of fairness and common sense").
212. Commenting on the Archer decision, Gordon Bermant states that "[iln moral terms, the
Court decided that bankruptcy law will protect values that the parties at one time had been willing to
compromise." Gordon Bermant, What's Stigma Got To Do With t?, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Aug 22,
2003, at 22, 22 n.1.
213. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314,317 (2003).
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assertions of fraud, which at "face value" does not offend the honest debtor
policy.
214
In contrast, cases such as Grogan v. Garner (In re Garner)215 have
relied upon this principle, but in those cases the plaintiff had previously
established fraud.216 As such, Grogan does not deal with the "antecedent
question, presented in this case [Archer], of whether a bankruptcy court fraud
inquiry is proper in the first place."217 Moreover, the enforcement of the
novation and the release provisions does not create "inequitable results" in
bankruptcy because the creditor and not the debtor, according to West,
released the original debt by accepting the settlement.218 Archer does not
214. See Respondent's Brief at 30-32, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-1418)
(discussing the reasons that the honest but unfortunate debtor principle is not offended in this case and
consequently does not require a nondischargeability ruling by the bankruptcy court).
215. Grogan v. Garner (In re Garner), 498 U.S. 279 (1991). In Grogan, the Supreme Court
considered whether Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code required proof of fraud by clear and
convincing evidence or by a preponderance of the evidence. l at 281-82. In this matter, the creditor
had received a judgment of fraud against the debtor, and when the debtor entered bankruptcy, the
creditor admitted the state court findings to object to dischargeability of the debt under Section 523(a)
(debt obtained by fraud). Id. The Bankruptcy Court utilized the doctrine of collateral estoppel to hold
the debt nondischargeable. Id. The debtor agreed that the evidence had been sufficient to prove fraud
in the state court; however, the debtor claimed that the Bankruptcy Code required clear and convincing
evidence, which is a higher evidentiary standard than the preponderance standard used in the state
judgment. Id. at 282. Thus, the debtor argued that collateral estoppel should not apply in the
bankruptcy proceeding. Id The Bankruptcy Code is silent on the standard of evidence for proof of
fraud under Section 523(a). Id. Grogan stated that the fresh start policy in bankruptcy did not require
a more searching evidence standard because that right is not absolute but limited to the honest but
unfortunate debtor. Id at 286-87. The Court stated: "We think it unlikely that Congress, in
fashioning the standard of proof that governs the applicability of these provisions, would have favored
the interest in giving perpetrators of fraud a fresh start over the interest in protecting victims of fraud."
Id at 287. Thus, the Court in Grogan stated that preponderance of the evidence was the proper
standard for Section 523(a) because it provided the proper balance between the fresh start policy for
debtors and the limitation of this policy to the honest but unfortunate debtor. Id
216. Respondent's Brief at 31, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-1418). For
example, in Grogan, the creditor had received a judgment of fraud against the debtor, and when the
debtor entered bankruptcy, the creditor admitted the state court findings to object to dischargeability of
the debt. Grogan, 498 U.S. at 281-82.
217. Referring to the Grogan decision, the respondent's [Warner] brief stated that "neither
case suggests that the 'honest but unfortunate debtor' policy forces" the bankruptcy court to
nullify a voluntary contractual agreement in which the creditor agrees to release all claims of
fraud. Respondent's Brief at 31, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-1418). In
addition, the respondent's [Warner] brief also stated that the petitioners [Archers] did not
present any case in which the courts have invalidated or barred a prebankruptcy contractual
agreement in which a specific release bars the creditor from later asserting fraud claims against
the debtor. Id. at 31 n.8.
218. West v. Oltman (In re West), 22 F.3d 775, 778 (7th Cir. 1994).
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trigger the honest but unfortunate debtor policy because the fraud claims
were not established, and the settlement agreement did not create an
inequitable result in bankruptcy that required application of this policy.
219
In addition, the Warners do not belong to the dishonest debtor category
described in Spicer, in which the fraudulent debtor sought to escape all
obligations by wooing the creditor into accepting a hefty settlement amount in
220exchange for a general release. In Spicer, the court stated that this type of
behavior allows any fraudulent debtor to receive the fresh start in bankruptcy
simply by changing the form of the original tortious debt.22' Certainly, this
classification paints a dismal picture of a debtor that has any connection to an
allegation of fraud.222 On the other hand, the Warners not only presented two
deeds of trust to secure the promissory note of $100,000 but also paid the
Archers $200,000 in cash at the execution of the agreement.223 The significant
cash settlement serves as a rational defense to the Spicer scenario, which
suggests that the Warners were merely attempting to change the form of the
obligation so that it would become a contractual obligation dischargeable in
bankruptcy.224
219. The question remains as to whether the honest debtor policy should punish even those
debtors like the Warners who have only been accused of fraud and have resolved alleged fraud
claims with a mutual agreement through which the creditors received a money settlement in
return for a voluntary release.
220. United States v. Spicer (In re Spicer), 57 F.3d 1152, 1155-57 (D.C. Cir. 1995). But
see Gaimio v. Detrano (In re Detrano), 222 B.R. 685,688 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998), rev'd, 326
F.3d 319 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that a "tremendous distance" exists "between pleading and
proving intentional torts," and until a fraud case has been proven or a debtor has admitted
liability, "there is no basis for presuming the defendant is an intentional tortfeasor for purposes
of either state law or federal bankruptcy law").
221. Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1156-57. According to Spicer, the Bankruptcy Code is supposed to
maintain a "delicate balance" between the debtor's rights and the rights of creditors that are the
victims of fraud. Id. Certainly, the "honest but unfortunate debtor" is a policy about fairness
and proper behavior that allows the debtor to receive a "fresh start" in bankruptcy; however, the
enforcement of a contractual agreement is also a matter of ensuring fairness between the parties
by preventing one party from receiving more than he or she bargained for in the agreement. See
Respondent's Brief at 23-25, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-1418) (asserting
that by "releasing creditors from the burden of their bargain, while allowing them to retain its
benefits, petitioners' [Archers] interpretation of the Code would thus undermine state contract
law in an important way").
222. The debtor in Spicer received a criminal conviction for his fraudulent activity, and the
settlement agreement released the civil action for fraud. Spicer, 57 F.3d at 1154. In contrast,
the allegations against the Warners were not adjudicated nor had liability been admitted by
either party. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314, 317 (2003).
223. Archer, 538 U.S. at 317.
224. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text (asserting that the fraud claims
against the Warners had not been adjudicated but were dismissed with prejudice and released in
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Although the honest but unfortunate debtor policy is an oft-cited policy
consideration within bankruptcy, it is not a controlling element of Archer.
225
The debtors were not adjudicated as fraudulent debtors, and more importantly,
the creditors had released all state law claims over the debtors.226 The debtors
also do not fit into the extreme group of fraudulent debtors described in
227Spicer. Thus, Archer does not trigger the honest but unfortunate debtor
policy or operate inconsistently with this bankruptcy policy.
F. Do the Attorneys Involved in Archer Bear Part of the Blame?
A pertinent question in this analysis of Archer is whether the counsel for
either party is at fault for the failed settlement agreement that led to this lengthy
conflict or the Supreme Court's complete reversal of the Fourth Circuit and
disregard of the novation theory.228 According to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, lawyers have a duty to provide clients with competent representation,
which includes "legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation." 229 A lawyer may be competent in a particular
area without having prior experience.230 Indeed, the lawyer may not have the
proper level of competence when accepting a matter but may "acquire the
necessary competence, through study, and preparation." 231 In Archer, the parties
were represented by counsel at all points in the conflict, and the attorneys had the
duty to approach the negotiation discussions with the "same skill, knowledge,
the settlement agreement).
225. LoPucki states that although "it is sometimes said that a bankruptcy discharge is
available only to 'honest debtors,"' this statement is an "exaggeration." LOPucKI, supra note
208, § 1.05. According to LoPucki, debtors who commit certain dishonest acts may be denied a
discharge in Chapter 7 cases but will often be eligible for discharge under Chapter 11 or
Chapter 13. Id.
226. Archer, 538 U.S. at 317-19.
227. See supra notes 220-24 and accompanying text (describing the fraudulent behavior of
the debtor in Spicer).
228. See supra note 174 and accompanying text (noting the lack of discussion about the
novation issue at oral argument).
229. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2002); see also RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
LEGAL ETmics: ThE LAWYER'S DEsKBOOK ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY § 2-1 (2000) ("Not
only the law of malpractice but the law of ethics requires lawyers to be competent.") (citation
omitted).
230. ROTUNDA, supra note 229, § 2-1.1.
231. Id.
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and diligence.., as that which an attorney must employ in all other litigation
tasks. v1232
The logical starting point to this discussion is the negotiation proceedings.
The first question is whether the creditors' counsel acted with proper skill and
knowledge in constructing the settlement agreement that created a novation and
permitted the bankruptcy discharge of the debt in the lower courts. According
to Robert J. D'Agostino, "[b]ankruptcy is common. Counsel negotiating
settlements cannot credibly claim surprise or nonforseeability that a settling
debtor might subsequently file for protection under the Bankruptcy Code. ,233 If
the counsel for the creditors knew that the main objective was to ensure
payment of the settlement sum, then reasonable knowledge and skill would
suggest that the creditors' counsel should have examined the potential effect of
the settlement agreement in bankruptcy. 234 A competent attorney has the
responsibility to analyze the potential effects of a settlement in more than one
context and to ensure that the settlement will meet the clients' needs.235
The creditors' counsel had a responsibility to be knowledgeable about
issues pertinent to the clients' needs during settlement negotiations.
Certainly information regarding the circuit split on novation was readily
available prior to Archer, and the creditors' counsel should have been on
notice about this issue. Drafting a settlement agreement for a debt that may
be nondischargeable in bankruptcy, "the creditor must take care not to effect a
232. Lynn A. Epstein, Post-Settlement Malpractice: Undoing the Done Deal, 46 CATH. U.
L. REv. 453, 459 (1997). According to Epstein, "over twenty percent of civil cases will be
resurrected in the form of malpractice actions initiated by dissatisfied clients," and every state
except Pennsylvania allows a client "to proceed with the theory that his attorney negligently
negotiated an agreement despite the fact that the client consented to settlement." Id. at 453.
233. D'Agostino, supra note 54, at 5; see also Warren & Westbrook, supra note 13, at 16
("When parties get into disputes, bankruptcy often looms at the edge of their negotiations and
maneuverings-a little like an exit door that has been left ajar .... The answer to these
questions [concerning a possible bankruptcy] profoundly affects the negotiations.").
234. See CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHics § 5.1 (1986) (discussing the
elements of competence required to meet professional legal standards). Wolfram explains the
knowledge and skill components of competence in the following manner:
A lawyer must know at least the basic elements of the law involved in representing
a client. A lawyer should carefully investigate the facts and analyze the client's
problem in light of applicable law. A lawyer should not have an overdeveloped
sense of his or her own competence or capacity for legal work.
Id.
235. See Epstein, supra note 232, at 467 (stating that not only the law but also a client's
perspective of what is equitable and fair plays a role in the negotiation process, and "[to
determine what a client perceives to be fair, an effective attorney must begin by determining the
needs and objectives of the client").
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'novation' that might alter the nondischargeable nature of the debt., 236 Thus,
the attorneys "might [have] insist[ed] on a release made conditional on
complete payment of the agreed upon settlement or include[d] specific
stipulations related to fraud., 23 7 The creditors might have attributed the loss of
the settlement (if the Supreme Court had upheld the Fourth Circuit's ruling) to
the negligence of their counsel in failing to fully research the issues and prepare
a settlement agreement that would not create a novation and a resulting
dischargeable contract debt in bankruptcy. 238 The various options available to
the creditors' counsel are discussed in Part VI.
A second factor to consider is the conduct of the debtor's counsel after the
Fourth Circuit decision that ruled in favor of the debtors and the novation
theory. During oral argument before the Supreme Court, the creditors asserted
that the debtor had "abandoned" the novation theory.239 The debtor's counsel
did not abandon the novation theory but definitely de-emphasized the argument
during oral argument and within the appellate brief.24° The lead argument in
the appellate brief focused on "principles of collateral estoppel and federalism,"
whereas the novation theory was discussed in only one paragraph.24'
Discussing the debtor's two main arguments, the creditors' appellate reply brief
stated that the lead argument had not even been raised in the court below or in
the objection to the petition for certiorari. 242  In addition, the debtor's
counsel focused on four main points during oral argument, none of which
claimed that novation alone was sufficient to create a dischargeable
236. LoPucKI, supra note 208, § 2.10.
237. See D'Agostino, supra note 54, at 5-6 (discussing the choices that a creditor may
have to preserve a claim of fraud for objection to discharge in bankruptcy and stating that the
creditor may "insist on a release made conditional on complete payment of the agreed upon
settlement or include specific stipulations related to fraud in any consent judgment").
238. See WOLFRAM, supra note 234, § 5.6.1 ("Courts in the United States have recognized
from a very early time a common-law right of a client to recover damages from a lawyer whose
negligent performance has caused financial loss to the client.").
239. Oral Argument Transcript at 57, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-
1418).
240. See infra notes 241-44 (noting that the debtor's counsel de-emphasized the novation
argument in the oral arguments before the Supreme Court and in the appellate brief).
241. Respondent's Brief at 10, 24, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-1418).
242. Petitioner's Reply Brief at 1, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-1418).
The Archers' reply brief claims that Warner's two main arguments were (1) a collateral estoppel
argument that "respondent [Warner] did not make ... below or in her brief in opposition to the
petition for certiorari .... [Tihe argument is therefore waived," and (2) an argument based on
the idea that the Archers had promised not to raise the issue of fraud. Id.
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debt in bankruptcy. 243 Indeed, the debtor's counsel only mentioned novation
in passing during oral argument.2"
If the Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari on the novation
issue,245 and the Fourth Circuit had strongly affirmed the effect of novation in
discharging a prior obligation,246 why then did the debtor's counsel de-
emphasize the most effective argument Warner had? Malpractice cases have
rejected claims based on "mere errors of judgment if the lawyer acted in the
'good faith' belief that the lawyers' advice and other assistance was in the best
interest of the client."247 Thus, the question is whether the decision to de-
emphasize the novation argument that had succeeded in the lower courts falls
within the carefully executed strategy category. The debtor's counsel could
have presented a more effective and consistent argument by focusing on the
novation concept instead of a collateral estoppel argument that left one member
of the Supreme Court "dumbfounded., 248 Although the debtor's counsel's
behavior may arguably constitute a "mere error of judgment," the fact remains
that the decision to de-emphasize the novation argument might have
contributed to the Supreme Court reversal in Archer.
Certainly, neither party's counsel emerged fault-free from Archer, even
though the creditors maintained their rights to the promissory note. If the
settlement agreement had been properly constructed, then the creditors would
not have had to vigorously pursue this matter to the Supreme Court. The
agreement could have avoided novation. In contrast, the debtor appeared to
have effective counsel during the negotiation process but might have suffered
harm when her counsel de-emphasized novation, which was the most effective
argument. This de-emphasis of novation might have cost the debtor the
243. See Oral Argument Transcript at 26-54, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No.
01-1418) (presenting the debtor's [Warner] oral argument before the Supreme Court in which
Warner wanted to present four main points and only mentioned novation in passing and in
relation to the larger argument that state law should control).
244. Id.
245. See Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314, 318 (2003) (stating that the
Supreme Court granted the petition for certiorari because "different Circuits have come to
different conclusions about this matter [referring to novation]").
246. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 283 F.3d 230, 236-37 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 538
U.S. 314 (2003).
247. WOLFRAM, supra note 234, § 5.6.2.
248. See Oral Argument Transcript at 30, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-
1418) ("There's ... no collateral estoppel here. That argument absolutely dumbfounded me,
frankly, because for collateral estoppel, issue preclusion, you must have... actually
litigated .... ).
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Supreme Court decision, while at the same time costing society the current
contractual quagmire created by Archer.
G. Analysis Summary
Archer fails to fulfill the Supreme Court's goal of unifying the circuit split
and, instead, appears to create more questions than answers. Questions arise as
to whether Brown is the proper governing precedent, or if Archer should have
recognized the necessity of achieving uniform outcomes in bankruptcy and
state court proceedings. Other questions arise as to the effectiveness of the
counsel for both parties. This Note argues that Brown is not the proper
governing precedent. Furthermore, the Supreme Court had a duty to uphold the
Butner principle and apply state substantive law to the issues in Archer. This
Note states that the Supreme Court should have addressed the public policy
supporting settlements and the enforcement thereof of valid settlements. The
Supreme Court should have upheld the novation theory, and the creditors'
proper remedy was to seek a malpractice claim against their attorneys for the
lost settlement.
VI. Alternative Actions: The Proper Remedy for Archer
The creditors in Archer were not faced with the sole option of a settlement
agreement complete with broad releases but had a variety of settlement and
litigation tools available that would have effectively secured the settlement as a
nondischargeable debt in bankruptcy. The creditors in Archer could have
circumvented the loss of the settlement in bankruptcy without pursuing the
extensive litigation that culminated at the Supreme Court.249  This Part
discusses the alternative courses of action available prior to Archer that could
have maintained the nondischargeability of the settlement while also preventing
250the creation of a novation.
249. Although the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the creditors in Archer, the creditors
still have no guarantee that the bankruptcy court will find the original debt nondischargeable
upon examining the extrinsic evidence regarding the fraud claim. Furthermore, the Supreme
Court remanded Archer to the Fourth Circuit for further determinations regarding a collateral
estoppel and a preclusive intent argument, either of which may prevent the creditors from
maintaining the settlement in bankruptcy. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text
(describing the alternative arguments raised by Warner and remanded to the Fourth Circuit by
the Supreme Court).
250. See Petitioner's Brief at 23 n.14, Archer v. Warner, 538 U.S. 314 (2003) (No. 01-
1418) (claiming that the Fourth Circuit's novation theory and interpretation of § 523(a) is a
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A. Litigate to Final Judgment in State Court Proceedings
Perhaps the best, but not the most efficient or cost-effective, method of
preventing the discharge in bankruptcy of an alleged fraudulent debt is for the
creditor to seek full adjudication of the claim in state court proceedings. 25' Indeed,
"the creditor who follows the 'race-to-the-courthouse' strategy and pursues the
defendant to final judgment strengthens its position and bargaining leverage against
the defendant should he or she then resort to bankruptcy. ',2 52 The burden of proof
for a nondischargeability action under Section 523(a)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code
is preponderance of the evidence, and a state court judgment must "require at least
the same standard of proof in order for preclusive doctrines, such as collateral
estoppel... to apply in the bankruptcy court."253 If the state litigation records
sufficiently address the required elements under a Section 523(a) claim, "the
bankruptcy courts will extend full faith and credit to the state court judgment.
'254
If the creditors in Archer had a viable state fraud suit against the debtors,
formal state adjudication would have been an option. A state court fraud judgment
in favor of the creditor presents a dependable nondischargeability claim, unlike the
novation created by the Archer settlement agreement. Furthermore, Rebecca
Callahan and Lisa Mathaisel state that creditors should fully adjudicate their fraud
claim in state court if the claim involves significant damages or debt, and the
creditors "cannot obtain fraud admissions or recitals from the defendant as part of
the settlement. '255 On the other hand, the decision to adjudicate a claim fully rather
than seek settlement is inconsistent with the public policy favoring
"trap for the unwary" because "astute creditor[s]" can "take steps to protect" themselves "in
negotiating a settlement agreement, to prevent the debt from being rendered dischargeable").
Discussing this possibility, the Petitioner's Brief recognized that a creditor has the option to
create a settlement agreement that includes a conditional covenant not to sue upon full payment
of the settlement (later discussed as an accord in this Part) rather than a full release of all claims.
Id.
251. See LoPucK, supra note 208, § 2.10 (noting that "many creditors have been
successful in litigating bankruptcy discharge issues in state courts before the bankruptcy petition
is filed and using the judgment to collateral estop the debtor in the bankruptcy case").
252. Callahan & Mathaisel, supra note 135, at 54. Furthermore, Callahan and Mathaisel
claim that "[t]here is no 'iron-clad' boilerplate language that creditors or their counsel can use in
a settlement agreement or consent decree that compromises a fraud claim to create a
nondischargeable debt under Section 523(a)(2)(A)." Id. at 53.
253. Kruis, supra note 10, at 7.
254. Id. at 6.
255. Callahan & Mathaisel, supra note 135, at 52. A final factor to consider in the
decision to seek formal adjudication rather than settlement of a fraud claim is whether the
settlement could be "performed or enforced upon default within a six-year period." Id.
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settlement. 256 The decision to forego settlement will result in increased litigation
costs, possible failure of the case at trial, and delay in payment.
B. Include a Fraud Admission in the Settlement Agreement
A second option available to creditors who want to maintain the
nondischargeable character of a settlement obligation is to include within the
agreement statements of liability from the debtor and facts sufficient to prove a
prima facie case of fraud.257 These statements of liability "should be coupled with
an acknowledgment and agreement by the defendant that he or she understands that
the legal effect of the admissions will preclude him or her from disputing these facts
in any subsequent legal proceedings brought to enforce the obligations assumed
under the settlement."258 Under this type of settlement agreement, the bankruptcy
court would not have to decide whether to look behind a settlement agreement
because the agreement would contain a stipulation presenting a prima facie case of
fraud sufficient to meet the requirements under Section 523(a), as well as
admissions of liability from the debtor.259
A creditor may not be able to obtain a full recital of the elements of fraud
or an admission of liability from the debtor to include within the settlement. If
the creditor receives only a "naked acknowledgment" from the debtor that the
settled debt arises out of fraudulent action, then the creditor can alter this option
by "dismissing the underlying action without prejudice, coupled with a
256. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text (describing the public policy in favor
of settlement between parties involved in litigation).
257. See Callahan & Mathaisel, supra note 135, at 51-53 (describing the options available
to create a nondischargeable settlement obligation by agreement). Moreover, Callahan and
Mathaisel also recommend that "[w]here a settlement relates to a fraud claim, the documentation
should include a consent decree with a verified statement from the defendant admitting facts of
fraud or defalcation, and a stipulation for entry of the consent decree upon default under the
settlement agreement." Id. at 52.
258. Id. at 53.
259. In contrast, a provision setting forth only that the debt is nondischargeable in
bankruptcy is unenforceable because it violates public policy, negating the nondischargeable
nature of a settlement obligation. See Klingman v. Levinson, 831 F.2d 1292, 1296 n.3 (7th Cir.
1987) (stating that the debtor may not "contract away" the right to discharge a debt in
bankruptcy through a provision stating a debt will "not be dischargeable in any bankruptcy or
similar proceeding," but emphasizing that a "debtor may stipulate to the underlying facts that the
bankruptcy court must examine to determine whether a debt is dischargeable").
Even though waivers to the right of discharge in bankruptcy are unenforceable as against
public policy, Callahan and Mathaisel recommend the inclusion of such provisions in settlement
agreements because the discharge waivers are "an evolving area of the law" and will serve as
support for a nondischargeability claim. Callahan & Mathaisel, supra note 135, at 51.
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covenant not to sue except under Section 523(a) if the debtor files bankruptcy
before paying the settlement obligation in full. ''26° The creditors' counsel in
Archer could have protected the creditors' interest in payment by negotiating
for these types of provisions. Instead, the resulting settlement agreement in
Archer explicitly stated that the promissory note was not evidence of either
party's liability and included no mention of fraud.26'
C. Accord and Satisfaction Agreement
Instead of creating a settlement agreement with broad release provisions
that extinguish all duties under the former obligation, creditors have the option
to create an accord agreement. 262 An accord is "a contract under which the
obligee promises to accept a stated performance in satisfaction of the
obligor's existing duty." 263 For example, a creditor may agree to release the
original fraud claim upon complete payment of a fixed amount in
damages. 264 If the debtor delivers full payment of the fixed amount and, as
a result, the creditor releases the original fraud claim, then accord and
satisfaction have occurred.265 The effects of an enforceable accord differ
from a novation because an accord maintains the creditor's ability to revive
the original obligation in the event that the debtor breaches the
agreement. 266 Lynn M. LoPucki argues that creditors should "preserve the
argument that the underlying debt is not replaced by settlement" by creating
260. Callahan & Mathaisel, supra note 135, at 52 (emphasis omitted).
261. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of the Archer
settlement agreement).
262. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 7, § 4.24 ("If the obligee is unwilling to give up its
rights on the original duty until the obligor has actually performed the new promise, the obligee
can make what is called an accord, rather than a substituted contract.").
263. Id.
264. See D'Agostino, supra note 54, at 6 (stating that parties should deal with concerns
about potential bankruptcy filings during settlement negotiations and noting that creditors may
protect their settlements from discharge in bankruptcy by insisting "on a release made
conditional on complete payment of the agreed upon settlement").
265. See PER1Lo, supra note 5, § 21.6 (describing an accord example in which C promised
to discharge D's debt if D delivered his car within a reasonable time).
266. Id. § 21.5. "Part performance by the debtor [in an accord], followed by unjustified
failure to complete, does not prevent an action by the creditor on the original claim .. " Id. In
contrast, a substituted contract [a novation] immediately discharges all duties under the original
obligation and replaces them with the substituted obligation. Id. A breach of the substituted
contract is only subject to the remedies available under the substituted obligation. Id.
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an accord and "by including in the settlement admissions by the debtor
sufficient to establish the nondischargeability of the underlying debt."
267
Certainly, the Archer creditors might have chosen the accord agreement or
one of the other options discussed in this Part as an alternative to creating a
novation. Because the creditors were not limited to only a broad settlement
with general release provisions, the majority approach's reliance on the need to
protect the innocent creditor as a victim of fraud is misplaced.268 There are
many alternative actions available to creditors to protect themselves, and the
responsibility of choosing the appropriate type of settlement is on the creditors
and creditors' counsel.
VIL Conclusion
The Supreme Court accepted Archer to resolve the circuit split that
surrounded novation and the nondischargeability of bankruptcy claims.269
The Court, however, failed to address the contractual and policy issues
within Archer and, in turn, created a contractual quagmire for those parties
seeking settlement of fraud claims. How can parties negotiating a
settlement contract rely upon explicit and bargained-for provisions if
Archer permits the bankruptcy court to look behind a settlement agreement
to determine if the underlying obligation was obtained by fraud?270 The
Court's selective implementation of the Archer settlement casts doubt on
the core concepts of contract law and serves as a detriment to the public
policy encouraging settlement and compromise between parties.
27'
This Note argues that Brown was not the proper governing precedent
and that the majority opinion in Archer is riddled with inconsistent
272language. The Court in Archer stated that the settlement agreement
267. LoPucKi, supra note 208, § 2.10 n.194 (3d ed. Supp. 2003). LoPucki made this
statement prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Archer and suggested this option because the
circuits had split on the issue of preserving a settlement debt in bankruptcy. Id. The conditional
agreement or accord suggested by LoPucki is essentially the same as the aforementioned
example in the text.
268. See United States v. Spicer (In re Spicer), 57 F.3d 1152, 1156 (D.C. Cir. 1995)
(discussing the policy of protecting the innocent creditor from fraudulent debts).
269. See supra Part V (analyzing the Supreme Court's decision in Archer).
270. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (noting Archer's potentially
detrimental effect on settlements).
271. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text (same).
272. See supra notes 152-75 and accompanying text (discussing whether Brown is the
proper governing precedent in Archer).
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released all the state claims yet the fraud claim had not been resolved.273
The settlement, according to Archer, may have created a novation, but the
Court chose to focus on Brown, a res judicata case.274 In addition, the
Archer Court failed to address the Butner principle demanding that
bankruptcy courts create results similar to state court proceedings.
275
Debtors should receive the same benefits in bankruptcy that they would
have received outside bankruptcy if bankruptcy had not ensued.276 Archer,
however, produces a result adverse to a state court proceeding and provides
an incentive for creditors to petition for involuntary bankruptcy to take
advantage of the more favorable forum.277
This Note concludes that the Supreme Court should have affirmed the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Archer. The Fourth Circuit's application of
the novation approach provided a uniform outcome with state court
proceedings, thus satisfying the Butner principle. The novation approach
also promotes the autonomy of parties to create valid settlement agreements
that have lasting effects within bankruptcy courts. Thus, the novation
approach, as endorsed by the Fourth Circuit, serves to cure the deficiencies
in the Supreme Court's Archer decision. This Note further states that the
creditors' proper remedy for the loss of their settlement as a dischargeable
debt in bankruptcy was a legal malpractice claim against their counsel. The
creditors' counsel had alternative settlement and litigation tools available
that could have prevented the creation of a novation and thus had a duty to
protect the creditors' interest.
273. Archer v. Warner (In re Warner), 538 U.S. 314, 318-19 (2003).
274. See supra notes 120-28 and accompanying text (stating the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Archer).
275. See supra notes 192-99 and accompanying text (noting the Court's failure to discuss
the Butner principle and its relevance to forum shopping).
276. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text (examining the underlying principles
in the Butner case).
277. See supra note 208 and accompanying text (asserting that Archer exacerbates forum
shopping because it violates the Butner principle and provides an incentive for creditors to
petition for involuntary bankruptcy).
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